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Summary 
 
Shifts in our climate and in associated climate policies provide potentially profound 
implications for the economy. Climate risks threaten to transform how and where 
humanity lives, reversing recent gains in development and mass poverty reductions 
and increasing the likelihood and scale of migration and conflict. The next 20 years 
will be critical in bringing about immense transformations of the global economy and 
the ways in which goods and services are produced, distributed and consumed. The 
global economy is still overwhelmingly dependent on oil, gas and coal, which make 
up almost 80% of primary energy use
2
. Fossil carbon emissions have to be reduced to 
zero if global temperature is to be stabilised, leaving open the potential for the mass 
scrapping and stranding of productive assets if the transition is not well managed.  
 
Under the Paris Agreement, reached at the 21
st
 session of the Conference of the 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
December 2015, almost every country in the world has committed to cutting annual 
emissions of greenhouse gases over the coming 10-15 years, and accepted a long-term 
path towards complete decarbonisation. The scale of investment in low-carbon energy 
such a transition will require is already shifting investor expectations, leading to 
predictions of further cost reductions as global markets expand and as technological 
innovation is induced. The value of high-carbon assets, such as the stocks of coal 
mining companies, is in decline and investors are increasingly analysing the risks to 
such assets which further climate policy may bring
3
.  At the same time, huge 
opportunities are emerging for innovators in renewable energy and energy efficiency 
technologies offering the potential to significantly boost the global economy’s long 
run productive potential.  
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 Policy-makers increasingly understand this and recognise the short-term benefits from 
effectively managing a low-carbon transition in terms of energy efficiency, energy 
security, urban pollution, congestion and generating innovation. This makes ambitious 
decarbonisation policy more likely and underlies growing business sector support for 
the Paris agreement.
4
 By contrast, business models reliant on the assumption that 
governments were not serious in Paris are looking increasingly vulnerable.  
 
The importance of effective disclosure is immediate. Actual or expected changes in 
policy, technology and physical risks as well as the threat of litigation could prompt a 
rapid reassessment of the value of a large range of assets as changing costs and 
opportunities become apparent. Our focus is not the detailed methodology associated 
with streamlining the process of disclosure, crucially important though this is. Our 
aim is to make sure that the top-down macroeconomic motivation for this exercise—
the need to limit systemic risk through an orderly adjustment in asset valuation, 
prevent avoidable financial loss and avoid locking in to stranded assets—is clearly 
integrated into the framing of the programme, in order to ensure the most effective 
provision of relevant information to investors. To achieve this requires careful 
assessment of forward-looking business risks and stress-testing against possible 
scenarios, acknowledging that many risks are mutually reinforcing and could unfold 
rapidly.   
 
Specifically, we recommend the Task Force: 
 
1. provides a clearer up-front articulation and unbundling of material risks, 
matched to the need for corresponding data and statements on forward 
strategy; 
2. tackles the marginalisation of non-physical risk in the report, and therefore the 
issue of exposure on account of carbon-intensity of business activities; 
3. most importantly, tackles the absence of a forward-look assessment of 
business vulnerability and ensures businesses provide an answer to the 
question "what strategy is in place to transition business models to ones that 
remain valuable if ambitious climate policies are imposed, or if disruptive 
climate impacts apply?" 
 
 
Public consultation  
 
As part of its stakeholder outreach and engagement strategy, the Task Force on 
Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) launched a public consultation on its 
Phase I report which set out the scope and high-level Objectives of the Task Force. 
This is in advance of the Phase II report, which is due to be delivered to the FSB by 
December 2016 and is tasked with addressing points arising from Phase I and setting 
out specific recommendations and guidelines for voluntary disclosure. A finalised 
report to be published around February 2017. This is a submission by the ESRC 
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on 
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The Phase I report is a scoping exercise and therefore not intended as a preliminary 
assessment or even a synthesis of substantive issues. Its primary aim is to develop 
recommendations for issuers of public securities, listed companies, and key financial-
sector participants with a target audience of investors, creditors and insurance 
underwriters.  It outlines requirements in terms of governance and metrics, to develop 
a common and baseline set of recommendations for the voluntary adoption of leading 
practices for company disclosure.  
 
The Task Force’s primary objective is to design a set of recommendations to:  
 
 promote alignment across regimes and address inconsistencies in disclosure 
practices; 
 address a lack of context for information;  
 ensure consistent and comparable reporting throughout the G20; 
 focus on material “climate-related” risks; 
 improve the ease of both using and producing financial disclosure. 
 
In response to the Phase I consultation we recommend the following.  
 
Recommendations 
 
1. Articulate and unbundle material risks 
 
This initiative is driven by the expectation that climate-related disclosures should help 
users determine whether companies or investors have established and implemented an 
effective risk management process, including key risk indicators and key performance 
indicators, and are committed to continuous improvement. This will: 
 
 enable more consistent and appropriate pricing and distribution of risks 
throughout markets;  
 
 reduce the potential for financial instability by reducing the likelihood of 
large, unexpected changes in value (due to abrupt changes in asset prices or 
expected future cash flows). 
 
The Phase I report acknowledges that “Climate impacts” may pose risks to economic 
and financial activity through multiple channels, a wide range of information can be 
included under the heading of “climate,” which, in turn, affects information to be 
disclosed under various regimes.  
 
The report further acknowledges varied impacts over time, geography, and industry—
and even among individual companies. Different companies may require different 
disclosures that reflect the nature of their business and the specific risks they face. 
This requires judgment when determining what information is most suitable and 
appropriate for disclosure. 
 
Changes in our climate and in associated climate policies provide potentially profound 
implications for individual business and the economy as a whole. In order to facilitate 
the stated aim of providing materially relevant, coherent and verifiable metrics and 
information, we recommend the Task Force more clearly identifies a taxonomy of key 
risk at the start. Terms such as “climate-related risks”; “climate-related issues”; 
“climate impacts” need to be defined, for example in the case of sentences such as “to 
enable a variety of financial market participants to better understand the 
concentrations of carbon-related assets”. A taxonomy of terms is necessary to arm 
the reader with the information they need.   
 
We recommend that the material specified in table 3B on page 24 of the report as used 
to guide the principles for financial disclosure. This will enable the report to match 
risks with corresponding corporate and financial activities and metrics. The table 
delineates: 
 
 Physical risks: these can be event-driven and occasional (acute) or relate to 
longer-term changes in precipitation, temperature, and weather patterns 
(chronic). 
 Nonphysical Risks: these can be grouped into four categories:  
o policy/legal/litigation;  
o technological changes;  
o market and economic responses (e.g., consumer preferences);  
o and reputational considerations. 
 Opportunities including commercial benefits.  
 
The full array of risks cannot be comprehensively described with precision, but we 
recommend some assessment of likely risks. For example, the landscape of key 
physical risks such as vulnerability of plant, equipment and infrastructure, upstream 
supply lines and availability of resources as well as depleted markets whose 
purchasing power is eroded by climate impacts needs to be mapped. This is a 
prerequisite for determining what data and information is pertinent to the assessment 
of risks. We also recommend that the Task Force seek information on vulnerability to 
risks without a known distribution: so-called ‘Knightian’ or deep uncertainty or 
‘unknown unknowns’. This is more challenging, but backward looking historical 
examples (such as the history of Eastman Kodak or Nokia) may provide insights on 
risks associated with rapid change and assist investors in adopting of formal 
techniques such as robust decision making. 
 
 
2. Tackles the marginalisation of nonphysical risk 
 
We recommend the Task Force place greater emphasis on nonphysical risks, a clear 
description of which does not emerge explicitly until p.21. Non-physical or ‘carbon’ 
risks associated with policies, technologies and litigation are more likely to impact the 
day-to-day activities of financial markets and lead to more rapid changes in valuation. 
The recent signing of the Paris Agreement on climate change can be seen as evidence 
of nonphysical risks materialising as policy-makers agree to national decarbonisation 
plans (many of these driven by an enhanced perception of national self-interest, for 
example from managing economic transitions, benefiting from associated gains in 
efficiency and reductions in air pollution and opportunities in developing low-cost 
renewable technologies). 
 
Pfeiffer et al (2016) analyse concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and 
conclude that in order to meet the two degree target (with 50% probability) no new 
emitting electricity infrastructure can be built after 2017, unless other electricity 
infrastructure is retired early or retrofitted with carbon capture technologies. This 
highlights the gap between what politicians have signed up to in Paris and what 
markets and fossil fuel companies are assuming. This gap should alarm policy-makers 
and central bankers: it suggest either asymmetric information or a lack of credibility 
in policies. This underlies the creation of a Task Force to focus on information and 
disclosure to allow proper pricing.  
 
The speed at which such re-pricing occurs is uncertain and could be decisive for 
financial stability. If the transition is orderly then financial markets will likely cope. 
But as Mark Carney recently noted “there have already been a few high profile 
examples of jump-to-distress pricing because of shifts in environmental policy or 
performance
5”. Moreover, it is clear that the subcategories of nonphysical risk listed 
in table 3B are not independent but co-vary and indeed are mutually reinforcing. Most 
obviously, a focused policy effort can lead to enhanced deployment of new 
technologies whose costs would be expected to come down as a result. Lower 
technology costs in turn make the application of decarbonisation policies more 
politically and economically palatable. This can generate positive feedback 
mechanisms which can lead to rapid step-changes.  
 
Conceptually, a variety of studies have identified that innovation and deployment of 
new technologies at times of structural change is ‘path-dependent’ (Romer, 1990; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Solow 1994, 1998; Krugman 1991; Shleifer, 1986; 
Krugman, 1991; Matsuyama, 1991, Redding 1996 and more). This means that at first, 
innovation and research tends to focus on further improving technologies and 
networks that are already established. However, if change is pushed, say, by 
technological breakthroughs (the shift from horses to combustion engines, canals to 
railways, kerosene to electricity) or credible and deliberate mission-orientated policy, 
feedback loops in the innovation process interact across the economy, prompting 
institutional and behavioural change and the possible emergence of new scale 
economies (Aghion et al. 2014).  
 
A current example of the difficulty in overcoming such lock-in is the challenge of 
developing electric vehicle infrastructure (Eberle and von Helmont, 2010). If electric 
vehicle infrastructure becomes established, the incentives to conduct research and 
development on electric cars will increase substantially relative to fuel cell or 
combustion engine vehicles. Since the Industrial Revolution firms have been routinely 
exploiting this path dependence in technology adoption and network effects in order 
to diffuse their innovations and create new markets (Bessen, 2014). For example, 
realising that fossil-driven networks are hard to dislodge, in June 2014 Tesla Motors 
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announced they would effectively make their electric vehicle patents public. Toyota 
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The emergence of a tipping point from one status quo to another may be facilitated 
by, but not reliant on, falling technology costs. Declines in technology costs can feed 
the cycle and make it self-reinforcing as new path-dependencies and expectations are 
created. The potential for unit costs to fall as new technologies are developed and 
benefit from learning and experience, and as engineers learn how to cheaply install, 
connect and repair technology, is higher for many new technologies than for long 
established incumbents. This has already allowed solar photovoltaic and onshore wind 
technologies to become competitive with gas and coal in a number of global locations, 
even without a strong carbon price. The cost of solar PV modules fell by a factor of 
five in the five years post-2008. As, planning institutions are updated and new 
networks are built or transfigured, then it is possible that the costs of new energy 
systems will fall further, and close (or exceed) the gaps with conventional energy 
sources (Bloomberg NEF, 2011; EPIA, 2011).   
 
Tipping dynamics further result from the fact that the perceived payoff to action to 
decarbonise by any single agent will be a function of what others are expected to do. 
Once enough players shift, for example in markets such as China, the US and the EU, 
the rest will quickly follow. Technology and finance costs are expected to fall while 
markets are expected to grow. This is why such risks are often termed ‘transition 
risks’, which is intended to portray a sense of the dynamic process in which paths 
become reinforcing.  
 
The point here is not that such tipping dynamics are about to happen, they might or 
might not. But if they do, change could be rapid.  Investors will rightly demand that 
firms have made appropriate contingency plans for such potential rapid changes, even 
if such changes remain one scenario among many.  Put another way, it is becoming 
increasingly risky for companies to pin all business strategies on the assumption that 
extensive decarbonisation will not happen, for example, on the basis because of 
(mostly backward-looking) lack of political will. 
 
It is also worth noting that the column labelled ‘opportunities’ in table 3B constitutes 
a subset of nonphysical risk. Political risk will apply with greater force to the losses of 
incumbents than to the equally valuable opportunities of new entrants. This is because 
in a representative political system such as the UK the losers will be more effective at 
lobbying politicians than potential winners. From the perspective of overall economic 
and financial risks, winners and losers should be treated equally, with the valuation of 
new sectors exploiting opportunities offsetting the decline in value of less productive 
and slow growing sectors.   
 
Finally, we note that physical and non-physical risks can co-vary. Sudden 
catastrophes may be followed by acceleration in policy effort to decarbonise. 
Consider the impact of a powerful hurricane in Florida.  This is likely to spawn 
extensive litigation and powerful lobbying which might prompt a swathe of policies to 
rein in emissions and build climate resilience. Such co-variance has important 
implications for the rapidity and distribution of potential risks, given the possibility of 
positive feedback.  
 
 3. Tackles the absence of a forward-look assessment of business 
vulnerability 
 
“Climate risks”, broadly defined, are expected to increase with time. Consequently, 
the vulnerability of companies will depend on their forward strategies rather than their 
backward performance. In such circumstances, all companies will benefit from 
building resilience and planning for decarbonisation, through access to new 
technologies and markets and compliance with new policies, but the degree to which 
they expect to benefit will depend on the costs of taking action and the distribution of 
risks. Some will be more exposed than others, but even in heavily carbon entangled 
sectors, competitive losses can be limited or avoided through proactive attempts to 
transform production processes and business models.  
 
The report acknowledges that mandatory and regulatory frameworks generally do not 
require dynamic or forward-looking disclosures or a framing in terms of risk 
assessment and strategic decisions to cope with risks. But in order to assess material 
risks, the Task Force needs to start tackling the absence of a forward-look assessment 
of business vulnerability. It is likely that all businesses will need to have an answer to 
the key question "what strategy is in place to transition business models to ones that 
remain valuable once ambitious climate policies are in place?" Similar questions 
relating to exposure to physical risks and future-proofing business models will have to 
be formulated, these varying according to different sectors’ exposure.  
 
Financial corporations and larger fossil fuel companies should be encouraged to 
undertake explicit sensitivity analyses and stress-tests, bearing in mind that many 
risks may be systemic and co-vary. Testing a company’s future viability against 
different carbon prices and regulations would be one way of teasing out the implicit 
assumptions in their forward planning. 
 
We feel that it would be a wasted opportunity if the Task Force were to merely 
‘rubber stamp’ existing disclosure, such as that collected by the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP).  There is no shortage of available financial data. The danger is that too 
much data that is not salient is collected. The metrics needed to quantify a forward 
assessment are less straightforward than, say, data on emissions, but a simple yet 
credible forward-looking statement of strategy may be more valuable in informing 
investors than reams of backward-looking data. Resilience requires the presence of 
forward risk management and hedging strategies. In addition to answering the 
question “what is your most likely scenario?” investors will seek to ask "what will 
you do in alternative scenarios such as a net zero emissions world?” The answer to 
this puts market players in a better position to assess market capitalisation.  
 
For example, if an oil company does not believe global policy makers will adopt the 
measures necessary to attain the decarbonisation outlined in the Paris Agreement, then 
they need to be explicit about this. From an investor point of view, it is one thing for a 
business to assume that governments were not serious in Paris, but it is quite another 
to pin their entire strategy on this being so. They need to address the overarching 
“what if” question outlined above. A resilient strategy needs to account for a number 
of possibilities.  
 
By way of example, it is not outlandish to conceive a breakthrough in battery storage 
technologies over the next two decades which might resolve problems with 
intermittent generation of electricity and induce a ‘breakthrough’ in the roll out of 
electric vehicles. Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla Motors, among others has sunk significant 
investment on just such a transition. A dynamic evolution of this type might be 
policy-led or policy-inducing (both being mutually reinforcing) but the point is that 
company business models would be vulnerable to such a risk. Such rapid change 
scenarios need to be on companies’ radars. In addition to what risks are considered, 
we recommend that companies explicitly disclose how such risks are considered, for 
example whether they are considered at board level or through an a separate 
compliance unit? 
 
We recommend that the Task Force ask CEOs and CFOs to articulate their positions 
on such questions in order for investors to take an informed view on risks. If oil 
company X has no response to the "what do you do in a net zero emissions world", 
then better to know that now so that their market capitalisation can fall in a gradual 
way.  If coal company Y’s response is "carbon capture and storage will save us", then 
investors can ask what it is doing to promote that solution, and whether they believe 
governments are backing them?  If oil and gas company Z’s response is 
"diversification and eventual transition to renewable energy will keep us ahead of the 
game”, then the market will assess their portfolio of investments in renewables to see 
if it goes far enough?  
 
These are hypothetical examples, but they offer an indication of the kind of forward-
looking frameworks that could be applied. Such questions would ideally be framed in 
a format such that answers are comparable across companies and sectors and usable 
by regulators. The Task Force can build on the Carbon Tracker Fossil Fuel Transition 
Blueprint, which provides a roadmap for individual companies to adapt their business 
practices and models consistent with an energy transition that delivers a climate 
secure global energy system
6
. In the longer term, a further set of questions might be 
aimed at national governments to help ensure they have economic strategies 
sufficiently diversified to limit sovereign exposure to climate risks. Such frameworks 
might be established in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and the 
Multilateral and Regional Development Banks.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Climate risks and climate policies are likely to have a profound impact on firms in the 
global economy in the years to come. The commitments expressed by almost every 
country in the world in the recent Paris Agreement cannot be safely dismissed. 
“Climate risks” (whether physical or nonphysical) must be clearly identified and 
business resilience assessed against them. Many of these risks are not independent but 
will co-vary, making a possible transition and price adjustment in the valuation of 
assets very rapid. What matters for “climate risk” is that companies have a strategy in 
place to transition their business models to ones that are valuable once serious climate 
policies are in place, or once climate damages have accrued. This needs to be 
formulated into specific forward-looking strategies and scenarios, broken down by 
components regarding policies, technologies, weather and other salient risks. 
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